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Social capital has not been measured in any general way yet as 
previous surveys have used their own ad hoc methodologies. This 
fact is due to the heterogeneity of the very definition of social 
capital. Therefore, consensus concerning measurement has not yet 
been reached. Based on ten existing empirical approaches at the 
macro, meso and micro level, we inductively identify the four main 
variables observed this far. By applying principal components 
analysis, we show that four indicators measuring elements of social 
capital at the micro, meso and macro levels all powerfully load 
onto one single underlying component. However, the results from 
the analyses also show that Putnam’s Instrument is the variable that 
has the weakest association with the unitary measure of social 
capital and may constitute a second component. 
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civic participation, generalised trust, principal component analysis.  1. Introduction 
The concept of social capital has in recent years been associated 
with a number of features central to public policy making. 
Referring to relatively elusive features such as “trust, norms and 
networks” (Putnam, 1993), it has been shown to be a causal factor 
of e.g. corruption (Uslaner, 2001; Bjørnskov, 2003b), economic 
growth (Whiteley, 2000; Zak and Knack, 2001) and good 
government (la Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny, 
1998; Knack, 2002). Social capital can alternatively also be defined 
as the ability of people to work together for common purposes in 
groups and organizations (Coleman, 1988, 95). As such, the 
presence of social capital determines how easily transaction costs 
are lowered because informal self-enforcement of contracts is now 
possible without third party enforcement. Having social capital can 
thus help alleviate Prisoner’s Dilemma-like situations and in this 
way, social capital becomes “the glue that holds societies together”, 
lubricating voluntary collective action, increasing income and 
accordingly serving as an additional production factor. 
Nevertheless, it has not been measured in any satisfactory way yet, 
but has been addressed in various ad hoc ways (see Paldam (2000), 
Paldam and Svendsen (2000) and Hjøllund and Svendsen (2000) 
for literature surveys). This shortcoming thus poses a serious 
problem when conceiving and evaluating public policy that takes 
the social capital dimension into account.  
Dasgupta (1999) describes the sociological and economical 
background for the use and interpretation of social capital while 
Paldam (2000) introduces “the social capital dream”: the wish that 
there exists an underlying rock upon which all the various 
definitions of the concept rest. If this is the case, the concept of 
social capital will be robust to variation in definition and thereby be 
a very useful tool for explaining a number of problems in the social 
sciences. Our ambition in this paper is therefore to trace whether 
there can be said to be one underlying factor for social capital when 
dealing with a number of proxies. If a standardized methodology 
for measuring social capital can be developed, it will open the door 
to a whole range of new research approaches. For example, it will 
be a most useful tool for such tasks recently addressed such as 
performing comparative studies, measuring the effect on economic 
growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Whiteley, 2000; Zak and Knack, 
2001), and measuring welfare such as happiness (Helliwell, 2001; 
Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2003a). Moreover, it will be a 
most useful concept in facilitating communication between all 
social sciences which, one way or another, have addressed the same 
underlying rock where “everything might be shades of and 
approaches to the very same basic phenomenon” (Paldam, 2000, 
641).  
 Studies of social capital have been conducted mainly in developing 
countries at the micro level, and in the United States. The studies 
that have included other developed countries are mainly cross-
national studies using a single measure, for instance that of 
generalized trust, that examine the correlation with growth rates, 
i.e. at the macro level. However, as noted by Brehm and Rahn 
(1997), “social capital is an aggregate concept that has its basis in 
individual behavior, attitudes, and predisposition.” Thus, there is a 
gap between purely micro level and case studies of social capital on 
one side, and the (too) simple macro economic studies on the other 
since its features are not directly observable (Hjøllund and 
Svendsen, 2000). As a consequence, a substantial part of the 
research effort has gone into examining how to conceptualise and 
measure features of social capital. Grootaert (1998) summarizes 
some of the early efforts and lists a large number of potential 
indicators, which can be divided into two strands: horizontal and 
vertical social capital. Other authors such as Narayan and Pritchett 
(1999) argue that the literature on social capital can be separated 
into three streams: the first one that is concerned with country level 
politics (including the growth aspect), whereas the second focuses 
on the meso-level (efficacy of institutions). Finally the third part of 
the literature considers social capital as a solution to market failures 
at the micro level. Regarding the question of measurement, this 
distinction does not tend to cause any major problems, as various authors seem to agree upon this three level distinction. At the micro 
level, social capital consists of networks and norms that govern the 
interactions among individuals, households and communities. At 
the meso level and the macro level, the functioning of institutions, 
rule of law and government, makes up social capital. All three 
levels are subject to the influence of public policy.  
 
Rose (1999) provides an interesting alternative approach. He 
considers the theoretical approaches to analysing social capital, and 
separates them, and their empirical treatment of the concept, into 
three alternative categories. The first category he labels “situational 
theories”, in which social capital is defined in situational and 
instrumental terms, i.e. it varies from person to person and from 
situation to situation. This, again, implies that social capital cannot 
be reduced to a single unit of account and then aggregated into a 
summary statistic characterizing the whole of society. This 
category was introduced by Coleman (1990). The second category 
is named “social psychological approaches” and maintains that 
social capital is a set of cultural beliefs and norms. Supporters of 
this approach argue that voluntary organizations emerge as a 
consequence of trust, rather than the reverse, i.e. social capital is in 
essence equal to trust. Social capital varies from person to person 
but is situationally consistent (or invariable); among others, this 
approach is represented by Inglehart (1997) and Uslaner (2002). Finally, in the third category, “culture theories”, culture is 
considered to be the source of trust and cooperation. Social capital 
is homogeneous among individuals belonging to the same culture 
(society), as well as consistent from situation to situation. This 
implies that it should be very simple to identify social capital for a 
specific culture, for instance a country (Fukuyama, 1995). 
 
Thus, economists, sociologists and political scientists differ in their 
approach to the theoretical explanation (and therefore empirical 
treatment) of social capital, which is the typical case when dealing 
with the new and multifaceted concept of social capital. It also 
inevitably means that it will form a big challenge to not only 
operationalise but also to standardize the concept and test the 
“social capital dream” in Paldam’s terminology. Our contribution is 
therefore to identify a general way of measuring social capital 
based on existing theoretical and empirical studies. After surveying 
a number of already existing methodological approaches in Section 
2, Section 3 turns to measurement and principal component 
analysis. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the results and briefly 
relates them to issues in public policy.  
 
2. Previous studies 
A single underlying factor for social capital has not yet been 
identified to our knowledge. This gap in literature and ideas for developing an appropriate social capital model based on the 
empirical patterns observed in reality this far may be identified by 
overlooking ten empirical approaches undertaken so far. We 
categorise these approaches according to micro, meso and macro 
level. 
 
Firstly, Narayan and Pritchett (1999) have done pioneering work in 
a study measuring social capital at the micro and meso level in 
rural Tanzania. They conduct a household survey (of 1376 
households in 87 clusters) to examine the link between social 
capital and village-level economic outcome. They ask questions 
about the households’ memberships in groups, the characteristics of 
these groups, and individuals’ values and attitudes (particularly 
their definition of and expressed level of trust). Thus, they use both 
of the two most commonly used indicators, namely membership of 
voluntary organizations and trust, in a combined quantitative 
measure of social capital.  
 
Secondly, Krishna and Uphoff (1999) similarly focus on 
generalised trust and the density of voluntary organizations as the 
main indicators of social capital. They demonstrate, in a watershed 
development programme in India, that such measurement is 
positively related with economic performance. They start out with 
constructing an index of development orientated collective action, and test this against alternative hypotheses that might explain the 
collective actions, thus testing the validity of this measure. 
Following this, they construct a social capital index from six 
variables (interview questions) - three structural and three cognitive 
- using factor analysis. And this index is positively and 
significantly related with the index of development orientated 
collective action (ibid; Hjøllund and Svendsen, 2000). It should be 
noted that Narayan and Cassidy (2001) uses a similar methodology 
in Western Africa with comparable results. Moreover, Krishna and 
Uphoff (1999) defend an ad hoc approach to measuring social 
capital, as they state that indicators of social capital need to 
correspond with the pattern of life in this largely agrarian setting. 
The data for the study are based on household surveys of 2397 
individuals and included questions related to a large number of 
what they considered as locally relevant activities. Afterwards, the 
questions for which more than 80 percent of the respondents 
indicated that this was considered an individualistic activity were 
excluded. Finally, Krishna and Uphoff approach their estimations 
and inferences critically by testing their specifications against 
alternative explanations in order to be able to eliminate irrelevant 
(though initially included) variables. This ensures validity of the 
measures and invokes a high degree of confidence in the results 
(Hjøllund and Svendsen, 2000).  
 Thirdly, Whiteley (2000) incorporates a micro measure of social 
capital as an explanatory variable into an endogenous growth 
model. The measure is constructed by a principal components 
analysis of three trust variables from the third wave of the World 
Value Survey. Along with several other explanatory variables (e.g. 
investments, education etc.) Whiteley regresses GDP per capita in a 
sample of 34 countries (for the period 1970-92). Because economic 
variables (including the explained variable) precede the social 
capital measure (one of the explanatory variables) in time, this 
could give rise to a discussion of the causality between social 
capital and economic performance. Whiteley is aware of this and 
therefore performs a test for it. By including older (less extensive) 
indicators for the measure of trust from 1981 in a regression using 
economic time series from 1981-92, he obtains similar results. 
 
Fourthly, Brehm and Rahn (1997) specify a structural model of 
social capital, consisting of the interaction between three concepts, 
namely civic engagement (Putnam’s Instrument), interpersonal 
trust, and confidence in the government, whereby they emphasize 
the existence of an endogenous (and dynamic) property of the 
concept of social capital. Using data from the General Social 
Survey from 1972 to 1994, they estimate their model in a pooled 
cross-sectional analysis combining latent variables (civic 
engagement, interpersonal trust, and confidence in government) for the key concepts and exogenous variables, all measured at an 
individual level. More specifically they estimate the model using a 
covariance structure analysis, which means using the correlation 
matrix as input. One of the implications (and advantages) of this 
approach is that missing data are deleted pair-wise rather than list-
wise which reduces the possibility of biases.
i First, they estimate 
measurement models for each of the three endogenous (or latent) 
variables, using factor analysis on exogenous explanatory 
variables. Second, they estimate the structural model using the 
three latent variables and some structural components. Brehm and 
Rahn obtain results that show that civic engagement and 
interpersonal trust are in a tight reciprocal relationship, where the 
connection is stronger from participation to interpersonal trust, 
rather than the reverse.
ii  
 
Fifthly, Rose (1999) defines social capital as the stock of formal or 
informal social networks that individuals use to produce or allocate 
goods and services at the micro level. Accordingly, his purpose is 
to identify the extent of formal and informal networks as well as 
the interaction between these two network categories. Finally, he 
emphasizes the lack of valid empirical indicators of social capital, 
even in the data-rich OECD countries. Rose does not undertake any 
econometric analysis of the data he has collected on Russian social 
relations. He simply reports the marginal distribution of the answers for the various questions, and from there he draws his 
conclusions. However, he does present a rather thorough and very 
important discussion of his considerations on formulating and 
selecting the appropriate questions. Rose claims that the 
investigated situations should be relevant to a majority of 
households regardless of economic status etc. and it should be 
situations in which formal organizations would be expected to 
deliver the goods or services. Finally, in every question focus 
should be on a particular good or service, and it should be left open 
whether the respondent relies on a formal organization or an 
informal organization to produce the good/service. With regards to 
the choice of method, this study has an interesting point 
(particularly relevant to our studies) of the existence of informal 
networks – working against (or instead of) the constituted formal 
networks in “anti-modern” (Rose’s concept) societies, such as 
Russia. Ideally, one should correct any measure of social capital for 
these societies with an indicator of this “negative” social capital 
that happens to be detrimental to economic growth (Hjøllund and 
Svendsen, 2000). 
 
Sixthly, as argued by Uslaner (2001), the level of corruption in a 
society may affect the level of social capital at the meso level. In 
the absence of corruption, we may expect a higher level of social 
capital and hence more economic growth because a low level of corruption implies strong enforcement of contracts thereby 
encouraging the voluntary building of trust among trading parties 
(Paldam and Svendsen, 2001).  To paraphrase Søren Kierkegaard, 
the ‘leap of faith’ involved in any transaction becomes shorter and 
hence more likely when strong and credible institutions are able to 
punish those who abuse one’s confidence. However, causality may 
run both ways. Uslaner (2001) and Bjørnskov (2003b), both using 
generalized trust as proxy for social capital, find that the influence 
of trust on corruption is substantially stronger than the reverse 
causal link. For example, trust makes people more willing to 
engage in transactions with more diverse people that in turn create 
increased competition for any corrupt practices. Generalized trust is 
also used as the proxy for social capital in research that establishes 
the causal effect of social capital on economic growth (Zak and 
Knack, 2001; Beugelsdijk, de Groot and van Schaik, 2002). 
 
Seventhly, Putnam (1993) introduced a simple measure of social 
capital at the meso level in an analysis of the differences in 
institutional efficiency and its influence on economic development 
between North and South Italy. Putnam found that to a large extent 
this could be explained by historically determined differences in 
the density of voluntary organizations. This basic and easily 
accessible measure has been a point of departure for many of the 
social capital analyses since then, and is almost always included as one of the explanatory factors (see Paldam (2000) who categorizes 
the measure as a member of the “trust family” and Hjøllund and 
Svendsen, 2000 concerning identification of different social capital 
measurement approaches).  
 
Eighthly, in the context of theories of household economics in 
developing countries, it is becoming common to consider social 
capital as a production factor, similar to human or physical 
capital.
iii A representative of this group of studies is Grootaert 
(1999) who analyses the link between social capital and household 
welfare and poverty in Indonesia by undertaking a multivariate 
analysis of the role of voluntary organisations at the meso level in 
affecting household welfare and poverty outcomes and in 
determining access to services. The data are generated by 1200 
household interviews mapping the different levels of society 
(household, community, and district), and interviewing respondents 
from identified focus groups.
iv Grootaert investigates six 
dimensions of social capital all dealing with voluntary 
organizations as represented by local associations, namely the 
density of associations, the internal heterogeneity, frequency of 
meeting attendance, members’ effective participation in decision 
making, payment of dues, and the community orientation of 
associations. From the values of these six variables, he constructs a 
social capital index, which turns out to be positively related to household welfare – measured by indicators of expenditure per 
capita, assets, access to credit, savings, school attendance, etc.
v 
Using instrument variables, Grootaert (1999) tests that the causality 
goes from social capital to income, and not the other way round. 
This result is robust to several sets of instruments. Finally, he 
compares the impact of household memberships in local 
associations with the impact of human capital on household 
welfare. He finds that at low incomes, the returns to social capital 
are higher than returns to human capital. At higher incomes, the 
reverse is true. In a similar study in Bolivia, however, Grootaert 
(2001) finds that the two types of capital contribute with equal 
amounts to income. 
 
Ninthly, measures of economic freedom can be used as macro 
proxies for social capital. An economic freedom index addresses 
the economic policies implemented by the government and the 
more centralised power is in the hands of bureaucrats, the more 
they can exert monopoly power when granting permissions for 
different activities. Such power centralisation will therefore distort 
economic freedom and beneficial macroeconomic policies thus 
lowering the general trust towards any macro economic institutions 
in that society (see Svendsen, 2003). Consequently, the annual 
World Bank report (WDR, 1996, 94) states that government 
credibility is low in Russia and Eastern Europe in general. Similarly, Rose and Mishler’s (1998) battery of questions about 
trust in macro institutions of Russian society indicated that most 
Russians distrust every major institution, especially representative 
institutions of governance. 
 
Tenthly, the level of decentralisation could influence the level of 
social capital by creating more corruption and influencing 
institutional quality negatively. Paldam and Svendsen (2001; 2004) 
compare former communist societies in Eastern Europe with 
capitalist democracies in Western Europe. They argue that heavy 
power centralisation during communism may explain why the 
general level of social capital here is roughly half of the level found 
in Western Europe when using trust proxies in a detailed 
questionnaire. Heavy state intervention in such centrally planned 
economies meant that the state made almost all decisions and 
coerced people into doing certain things, thereby presumably 
eliminating entrepreneurship, experiments and voluntary 
organisation into social groups. As a consequence, during the 
purges people learned to trust nobody, and to restrict all activities 
to the (relatively) safe task of obeying orders (Paldam and 
Svendsen, 2001), an argument elaborated empirically by Bjørnskov 
and Svendsen (2003). 
 
3. Data and measurement The review of empirical studies in Section 2, summarized in Table 
1, suggests that social capital measures at three levels can be 
compressed into four dominant operational features.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
First, the micro-level factor of generalised trust may be used as a 
proxy for social capital as it is the percentage of a population 
answering confirmatory to the question “do you think that most 
people can be trusted, or can’t you be too careful?” i.e. it can be 
said to measure the normal trust radius of a population. As such, it 
is an inclusive, horizontal measure of social capital. We do not 
attempt to incorporate networks in this factor due to the risk of 
incorporating negative social capital as argued by Rose (1999) 
above. Furthermore, networks are not easy to measure in practice 
(Putnam, 2001) while trust has documented beneficial 
consequences (Whiteley, 2000; Bjørnskov, 2003b). 
 
Second, including Putnam’s Instrument as another proxy for social 
capital at the meso level in the analyses below provides a more 
exclusive and less horizontal measure also addressing civic 
participation. The Instrument measures the density of voluntary 
organizations in a given country as the number of organizations in 
which an average citizen participates; i.e. it provides a measure of individual network density. The 16 different organizations to 
choose from in the questionnaire upon which the measure is based 
have various degrees of inclusiveness and formality. Some of these 
organisations can hardly even be said to constitute a horizontal and 
informal element of social capital, as e.g. labour unions and 
religious associations tend to be strictly hierarchically organised in 
many societies while others may have exclusive member 
requirements. These data on trust and Putnam’s Instrument are both 
drawn from the third wave of the World Values Survey (Inglehart, 
Basañez and Moreno, 1998) combined with more recent data from 
the European Values Study (van Schaik, 2002). 
 
Third, corruption has been used as an indirect measure of social 
capital at the meso and the macro level too. Corruption cannot be 
said to be wholly horizontal, but not whole vertical either, as it 
captures illegal asymmetric, horizontal social relations that enable 
people to extract gains from vertical relations with formal 
institutions. Also, a non-corrupt institutional set-up will increase 
citizens’ trust in institutions thus capturing a macro aspect of trust 
in government. Furthermore, it should be noted that Uslaner (2001) 
and Bjørnskov (2003) document that generalised trust is a strong 
causal factor of corruption. We use the Corruption Perceptions 
Index, which is measured as the level of corruption at national level 
in 2000 (Transparency International, 2001). The data are generated on the basis of interviews with business people, risk analysts and 
the general public in 89 different countries concerning their 
perceptions of the degree of corruption. The index is thus based on 
subjective perceptions (how people think it is), which do not 
necessarily show how the situation really is. The score ranges 
between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt), i.e. high scores 
mean low corruption and low scores mean high corruption; as such 
the index is really an index of perceived honesty, as low values 
show corruption and high values show honesty.  
 
Fourthly, at the macro level, Freedom House publishes an annual 
assessment of economic freedom in the world by assigning each 
country and territory a status of free, partly free, or not free by 
averaging overall ratings on political rights and civil liberties 
obtained from raw scores on a wide range of issues and represented 
in a discrete index between one and seven. The Freedom House 
(2002) measure of civil liberties is included as a vertical element of 
social capital, as it provides a much-used measure of the quality of 
formal national institutions, i.e. a potential vertical element of 
social capital as proposed by Grootaert (1998). Norris (2001) 
reports that the civil liberties index is significantly associated with 
other social capital measures. The measure contains information on 
e.g. the extent of freedom of speech and organization, and may as 
such be a necessary precondition for forming the type of organization measured in Putnam’s Instrument. In addition, bad 
institutions, i.e. those with discretionary power to arbitrary 
punishment, have been argued to play a central role in the decline 
of interpersonal trust during the communist era in Eastern Europe 
(Paldam and Svendsen, 2001; Rothstein and Stolle, 2002).  
 
By relying on these four indicators, the paper thus attempts to 
capture a broad element of national social capital more precisely by 
including proxies with various degrees of horizontality / verticality 
and formality / informality. We thereby aim at constructing a social 
capital measure that is more or less free from imposing structural 
constraints on the way social capital works in different countries. 
The choice of these indicators is motivated by the fact that 
numerous studies have shown them to be significantly related to 
e.g. economic growth, although not all under the heading of social 
capital. Whiteley (2000) and Zak and Knack (2001) show the effect 
of trust, Beugelsdijk, et al. (2002) find a causal effect of Putnam’s 
Instrument; Mauro (1995) show the connection between corruption 
and economic growth, and Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Farr, 
Lord and Wolfenbarger (1998) show how civil liberties is 
conducive to growth. Other cases include Culpepper (2000) who 
analyses a French case where institutional cooperation between 
state and employer’s organisations is crucial when implementing 
public policy, and Frey and Stutzer (2002) and Bjørnskov (2003) who shows a positive association between social capital and 
happiness. As all are included in parsimonious definitions of the 
social capital concept and seem to have comparable effects on 
growth, it thus seems natural to hypothesize that they are all 
indicators of the same feature.  
 
By employing factor analysis, we aim to reduce these explanatory 
variables into one or a few variables. This could be an obvious way 
of obtaining a simpler measure of social capital and test whether 
the measures are indeed shades of the same basic phenomenon. We 
therefore move on to discuss the methodology of factor analysis, 
more specifically principal component analysis (PCA), which can 
be used to analyse the data. Factor analysis is a commonly used 
tool for constructing measurement indices, and although it is a 
rather disputed method, we find that for this purpose it is very well 
suited.  
 
The notion of factor analysis is a common description of several 
different methods, of which principal components analysis (PCA) 
is a specific method for simplifying data by means of an 
approximate description. This approach is considered explorative 
as opposed to common factor analysis, which constitutes a 
confirmatory approach. This point is relevant to our considerations 
of methodological choice, since we intend to investigate data in order to determine whether any underlying explanations / relations 
exist. The PCA is the relevant choice for this and we will therefore 
focus on this specific method here. 
 
All the various theories of factor analysis including PCA rest on the 
explanation of correlation between two (or more) variables to be 
that of “measuring the same thing” – as opposed to explaining each 
other, for example. More specifically, the principal component 
theory is based on the multiple correlation principle and seeks to 
explain the variance of the independent variables. This is done by 
the identification of one or a limited number of indices (denoted 
scores) constructed from weighted combinations of the independent 
variables. The simple correlations between our four variables are 
shown in Table 2, which also reports partial correlations when 
controlling for economic development. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The table shows the relatively high correlations between the chosen 
variables, but also reveals a potential problem, as Putnam’s 
instrument is uncorrelated with any of the other variables once 
economic development has been controlled for. This could be 
interpreted as being in line with Whiteley (2000) who claims that 
the popular definition by Putnam (1993) confuses two features of the concept. He views the concept as consisting of both 
psychological phenomena such as norms and trust, and behavioural 
traits such as networking. As Putnam’s Instrument is conceived as 
a measure of the latter, the problems in Table 2 may be 
unsurprising. However, laying these problems aside for a moment, 
we first perform a PCA with all four variables to test the hypothesis 
that social capital is a unitary concept, i.e. that all proxies can be 
said to rest on a common bedrock of meaning. If this is so, the 
measurement problem can be reduced to simply using one of the 
above variables or a combination of two or more of them. If not, 
the results from using different proxies imply different 
interpretations and thus also different prescriptions for public 
policy that depends on social capital. 
 
Table 3 lends considerable support for the hypothesis that social 
capital at the national level can be treated as a one-dimensional 
concept by documenting (in column 1) that all four proxies of 
social capital load very powerfully onto one underlying principal 
component extracted from the data. Furthermore, the table also 
suggests that excluding one of the four variables from the PCA 
should be considered acceptable, as the components extracted in 
columns 2-5 exhibit very similar factor loadings. This can also be 
seen in Table 4, which shows that the correlations between the 
components in columns 1-5 using different combinations of three variables are extremely high.
vi In these cases, the Kaiser-Meyer 
Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy is sufficient whereas 
it is somewhat lower when only including two variables. The 
percentage of the variation in the data explained by the common 
component is between 67 and 75 percent, which is also satisfactory. 
Including only two variables in general exhibits substantially lower 
cross-measure correlations (in columns 6-11 and in some cases also 
creates some problems of sampling adequacy. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The tables thus lends considerable support for the one-
dimensionality hypothesis and as such, the measurement problem 
and policy recommendations only boils down to having adequate 
data on at least one of the many potential social capital proxies. We 
nevertheless perform an intuitive test to be sure that the common 
underlying component is not an effect of omitting a variable, since 
the simple correlations in Table 2 suggests that economic 
development measured as income per capita could induce an 
omitted variable bias in our PCA. We therefore run simple 
regressions with per capita income in a linear and a squared term 
on the right hand side and any of the four variables on the left hand side. Doing this, we take out most of the variation in the scores 
attributable to economic development. We thereafter run the PCA 
with the residuals from these regressions, which can be seen as the 
variation capturing a core of the variables free from any effects of 
economic development, i.e. the residuals are measures of an 
entirely  social capital. This is an extreme test of the one-
dimensionality hypothesis, as income also proxies for a plethora of 
other features, but it addresses any potential omitted variable bias 
arising from e.g. the fact that the variables in principle could have 
nothing else in common but their association to income. The results 
are shown in Table 5. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
As the table shows, the one-dimensionality hypothesis fails the test. 
Although the PCA only exhibits one eigenvalue above unity, the 
second component has an eigenvalue so close to one that we cannot 
discard of it. Furthermore, it also explains an additional 25 percent 
of the variation in the data. The test thus reveals much the same 
feature that the partial correlations in Table 2 do: Putnam’s 
Instrument may only be spuriously related to the remaining 
indicators, as the simple correlations and results of the analyses in 
Table 3 may simply be effects of omitting economic 
development.
vii The conclusion deriving from a PCA with the raw proxies that the social capital concept refers to one and only one 
underlying feature of society need not be final.  
 
As a consequence, the many studies connecting social capital to the 
efficiency and constraints to public policy must be viewed more 
sceptically, as it need not be trivial which proxy is used. We 
therefore may need to divide the social capital concept into two 
dimensions where one dimension (component 1 in Table 5) refers 
to honesty and trust in both fellow citizens and institutions, and 
another dimension (component 2) refers to civic participation. The 
former thus includes generalised trust, civil liberties and corruption 
while the latter consists of Putnam’s Instrument. Another appealing 
way to view this division congruent with Whiteley’s and Uslaner’s 
critique of Putnam’s definition could be to view the first dimension 
as a manifestation of psychological and moral phenomena (trust 
and honesty) and the second dimension as a “behavioural 
relationship between individuals, moulded by the institutions in 
which they live” Whiteley (2000, 447). Both dimensions can 
obviously be influenced by public policy making the conceptual 
division the more relevant. 
 
4. Conclusion 
A number of recent studies have connected public policy problems 
and social capital. Social capital is becoming a buzzword in the policy debates around the world, but this should not discourage the 
development of a more precise and detailed understanding of it; 
hence this paper. Our main question concerns how to measure the 
level of social capital within a country, which may not be trivial. 
Generally speaking, each survey has used its own ad hoc method of 
measurement, which again could be partly explained by the 
heterogeneity of the very definition of the concept of social capital. 
Thus, a gap in the literature exists as no general method of 
measurement has been established yet. It is nevertheless necessary 
to know whether one measure is as good as another, or if they in 
reality measure disparate phenomena. 
 
We have in this paper taken a tentative step towards filling this gap. 
By applying principal components analysis, we show that four 
popular indicators measuring elements of social capital at the 
micro, meso and macro levels all load powerfully onto a single 
underlying component. We hence show that at the national level, it 
may make sense to talk about ‘social capital’ as a unitary concept. 
This could be a useful insight for future research efforts on the 
effects of social capital and in particular the role of public policy in 
building social capital. However, the results from the PCA also 
show that Putnam’s Instrument is the variable that has the weakest 
association with the unitary measure of social capital. We therefore 
test whether this is due to omitted variable bias by purging the proxies for effects of economic development. Our test shows that 
this may indeed be so, but this result should be interpreted 
tentatively, as the test is admittedly very strong. It may nevertheless 
show some support for Whiteley’s (2000) claim that the concept 
covers two different phenomena. 
 
Overall, our results thus indicate that it makes sense to treat social 
capital as a one-dimensional concept. However, one should be 
extremely careful when interpreting empirical results from using 
different measures. This insight has special consequences for 
public policy, namely that specific policies could influence an 
attitudinal dimension of social capital, but not a behavioural 
dimension, and vice versa. For example, the behavioural dimension 
probably influences cooperation between formal institutions and 
stakeholders while combating corruption has been shown to depend 
on proxies relating to the attitudinal dimension. In other words, one 
should be careful to design public policy manipulating national 
social capital such that it influences trust and honesty or civic 
participation in the desired direction, and not just includes the 
buzzword ‘social capital’.  
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Table 1. Social capital measures at the micro, meso and macro 
level. 
Authors  Micro Meso Macro 














3. Whiteley (2000)  Trust factor     




Civic participation Trust in 
government 
5. Rose (1999)  Network    Trust in 
government 
6. Uslaner (2001)    Corruption  Corruption 
7. Putnam (1993)    Voluntary 
organisations 
 
8. Grootaert (1999)    Voluntary 
organisations 
 
9. World Bank (1996)      Economic 
freedom 
10. Paldam and 
Svendsen (2002) 
   Decentralisation 
  
 






















































































Corruption     1.00  -0.690** 
(-0.478**) 
0.870** 
Civil liberties        1.00  -0.687** 
Note: figures in parentheses are partial correlations with GNI per capita as 
control variable; ** denotes significance at the 5 % level (* at 10 %). 
 
 
 Table 3. Principal components 
  1  2  3 4 5 6  7 8  9  10  11 
Generalised  trust  0.870  0.823    0.899 0.859 0.860  0.918 0.855       
Putnam’s  Instrument  0.693  0.722  0.750  0.759  0.860     0.828  0.864   
Civil liberties  -0.838  -0.837  -0.850    -0.831    -0.855  -0.828  -0.919 
Corruption  0.930  0.931  0.900  0.913     0.918    0.864  0.919 
Observations  32  46  34 32 32 32  46 46  34 34  105 
Percent  explained  70.1  74.9  68.5 73.5 66.8 74.0  84.3 73.1  68.6 74.7 84.5 
 
 Table 4. Correlations between components 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11 
1  1.00  0.977 0.978 0.976 0.983 0.909 0.949 0.954 0.893 0.929 0.953 
2    1.00  0.924 0.943 0.936 0.834 0.955 0.971 0.782 0.845 0.961 
3      1.00  0.945 0.962 0.881 0.875 0.879 0.949 0.938 0.952 
4        1.00  0.959 0.959 0.957 0.912 0.861 0.953 0.888 
5       1.00  0.940  0.901  0.943  0.933  0.921  0.894 
6        1.00  0.859  0.838  0.881  0.932  0.744 
7         1.00  0.911  0.714  0.837  0.861 
8          1.00  0.771  0.784  0.899 
9           1.00  0.895  0.828 
10            1.00  0.824 
11             1.00 
Generalised  trust  0.870 0.823 0.751 0.899 0.859 0.860 0.918 0.855 0.628 0.727 0.636 
Putnam’s  Instrument  0.693 0.529 0.722 0.750 0.759 0.860 0.526 0.508 0.828 0.864 0.479 
Civil  liberties  -0.838 -0.837 -0.850 -0.699 -0.831 -0.593 -0.639 -0.855 -0.828 -0.619 -0.919 
Corruption  0.930 0.931 0.900 0.913 0.848 0.761 0.918 0.817 0.719 0.864 0.919 
Income  0.829 0.792 0.809 0.816 0.800 0.743 0.754 0.700 0.702 0.769 0.842 
Note: all correlations are significant at the 1 % level. 
 
 Table 5. Principal components without income effects 
 Residual of:  Component 1  Component 2 
Corruption 0.875  0.148 
Civil liberties  -0.672  0.176 
Putnam’s Instrument  0.064  0.954 
Generalised trust  0.699  0.252 
Eigenvalue 1.79  0.95 
Percentage explained  68.2 
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i A list-wise deletion of missing data would favour the respondents who answer 
all questions, and therefore are most likely to be the most involved citizens. 
ii This view has since been challenged by Claibourn and Martin (2000) who find 
evidence that the apparent reciprocal relationship between social capital and 
civic engagement is a symptom of a selection mechanism at work, and hence not 
in any sense real. 
iii Interpreting the concept as “capital” basically means that it is a stock that 
yields a flow. 
iv This method of categorizing is similar to the one recommended by Krishna and 
Shrader (1999). 
v Grootaert claims, that using the additive index of the number of memberships 
and the index of active participation in decision-making (with equal weights) 
explains just as much as using all the variables. So, this is what he does. 
vi Performing a PCA with the 11 components can further corroborate this notion. 
All load powerfully (load coefficients above 0.9) onto one common component, 
which preserves 91 percent of the variation in the data. 
vii It should be noted that if we substitute civil liberties with either Kaufman, 
Kraay and Ziodo-Lobaton’s (1999) rule of law index or the Fraser Institute index 
of legal structure and security of property rights (Gwartney and Lawson, 2002), 
which are arguably more precise although less well known measures, the effect 
is exactly the same. 